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Globalisation, Multinationals and Productivity in Japan’s Lost 
Decade 
by 
Tomohiko Inui, Richard Kneller, Toshiyuki Matsuura and Danny McGowan 
Abstract  
 
Myriad hypotheses have been advanced to explain the dismal performance of the 
post-1990 Japanese economy.  In this paper we use plant and firm data to investigate 
the issue.  The low rate of productivity growth in Japan is also often seen as a product 
of Japanese MNEs offshoring production and shutting plants that are relative to others 
in their industry, high productivity. We find that this is true, plants shut by MNEs are 
relatively more productive than the industry average, but they are generally weaker 
elements of the MNE more generally. This behaviour is also not distinct to MNEs.  
Our analysis suggests that the rate of productivity growth within firms is also partly a 
consequence of low entry and exit rates. Generally we find that the determinants of 
productivity change are similar to those found for other countries, but that 
productivity improvement is lower in industries in which globalisation is higher. The 
low rate of entry and exit in Japan therefore means that this affects more firms than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
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The dismal performance of the Japanese economy since the early 1990s has attracted 
significant attention and debate.  Often macroeconomic factors such as fiscal policy or 
the liquidity trade have been emphasises.  Others have used micro level data and 
sought to explain the low rate of productivity growth that accompanied the lost 
decade, with the industrial structure of Japan, the banking sector and multinational 
firms often identified as key factors.
  
 
Japanese multinationals have received particular criticism with their ‘elite 
globalisation’ strategies receiving strong criticism.  This has often focused on the 
accusation that the domestic manufacturing sector has been ‘hollowed out’ as 
multinationals offshore production to lower wage economies elsewhere in Asia and 
that what were relatively productive Japanese plants have been closed.  Others have 
taken the opposite view that the rate of firm and plant closure has been too low due to 
stringent bankruptcy laws, a unique industrial structure and government intervention 
and that this has resulted in a plethora ‘zombie’ companies. Equipment, buildings and 
labour have been fossilised in firms that achieve relatively low sales and profit 
margins.   
 
In this paper we attempt to discriminate between these different explanations for low 
productivity growth in Japan using micro level data.  We begin by decomposing 
aggregate productivity growth to assess the relative contributions from productivity 
improvements within plants, those which occur from the entry and exit of firms and 
the reallocation of market shares across firms. We find that the weak contributions 
made from the entry/exit and within plant growth components appear to be the main 
contributors to the low aggregate growth.  
 
We then focus in detail on the determinants of these sources of productivity change. 
Within this we include questions prominent within the previous literature, but which 
have so far lacked formal quantitative evidence. With respect to the firms and plants 
that are closed down we find that, as in other country contexts, these firms are likely 
to be small and have low productivity. However, the estimated marginal effects are 
much smaller, a consequence of the very low rates of entry and exit from Japanese manufacturing. These low exit rates are at least in part explained by a striking 
difference between Japanese firms and those in other developed countries. Our results 
suggest that increased globalisation, including a measure of increased import 
competition from low wage economies, has had no effect on the entry and exit of 
firms and plants in Japan.  The strict rules on bankruptcy laws and ‘zombie’ loans 
hypotheses are rejected in favour of an explanation that focuses on the regulations in 
place that prevents the entry of new firms.  We also find that while plants shut by 
MNEs are relatively more productive than the industry average, but they are generally 
weaker elements of the MNE more generally. This behaviour is also not distinct to 
MNEs: other multi-plant firms also shut weaker plants. Indeed the behaviour of these 
two types of firm is very similar, including again their lack of response to increased 
globalisation.  
   
 
                                                
1.  Introduction  
 
During Japan’s ‘Golden Age’ (1956-1973) growth in output per worker averaged 8% per 
annum, four times the rate recorded in the United States over the same period.  While capital 
flows doubtless played a part in resurrecting a country destroyed by war, the productivity 
miracle was ultimately responsible for the sustained successes of the economy, culminating in 
Japan becoming the world’s second largest economy and raising per capita income levels from 
27% of US levels in 1956 to 69% by 1973 and 84% by the start of the 1990s.
1  The subsequent 
‘lost decade’ has seen GDP growth stagnate and has been mirrored by equally sluggish 
productivity growth.  In our sample we estimate that across the manufacturing sector 
productivity growth averaged just 0.5% per annum from 1994-2005, while per capita income is 
estimated to have fallen to around 72% of US levels.   
 
Numerous hypotheses have been advanced to explain Japan’s soporific economic performance 
since the early 1990s. Often these emphasise macroeconomic factors, such as fiscal policy (both 
too little and of the wrong sort) or the liquidity trap (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002).
2 Others have 
instead used micro level data and sought to explain the low rate of productivity growth that 
accompanied the lost decade, with the industrial structure of Japan, the banking sector and 
multinational firms often identified as key factors.
 3  
 
A number of competing arguments are included here. Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) for 
example, argue that it was caused by the ‘elite globalisation’ strategies of Japanese MNEs.
4  
The domestic manufacturing sector has been ‘hollowed out’ as multinationals have offshored 
 
1 Data from Maddison (2009). 
2 Makin (1996) for example cites the slow response of the Bank of Japan to reduce interest rates due to outdated 
inflation measures, and the impact this may have had on peoples’ beliefs.  Or alternatively, Krugman (1999) argues 
that the aging population’s desire to save for their retirement, along with the country’s risk adverse nature, 
demonstrated by its high savings rate and accentuated by the collapse of the bubble economy, reduced consumer 
spending. 
3 These are of course the same factors often used to explain its relative economic success up until that point. 
4 Over the period of study some 800,000 jobs have been shed by Japanese manufacturing firms. production to lower wage economies in the rest of Asia. This has resulted in the closure of what 
were relatively productive domestic plants adding further drag to productivity.
5 A different 
explanation for the closure of more productive firms is offered by Nishimura et al. (2005), who 
focus on the role of banks in allocating financial resources to productive firms. They argue that 
during the 1996/7 financial crisis this link broke down such that firms with relatively low 
productivity survived at the expense of those with higher productivity. Kimura and Fujii (2003) 
argue instead that excess plant closure during the 1990s reflected the reversal of the rapid 
expansion into new products and markets by Japanese firms during the 1980s.  
 
Some in the literature have taken the opposite view that the rate of firm and plant closure has 
been too low, rather than too high. Caballero et al. (2003), Peek and Rosengren (2003), Ahearne 
and Shinada (2005) and more recently the Economist (2009) have argued that stringent 
bankruptcy laws, a unique industrial structure and government intervention have resulted in a 
plethora of what they label ‘zombie’ companies. Equipment, buildings and labour have been 
fossilised in firms that achieve relatively low sales and profit margins.   
 
Finally, others emphasise the weak contributions to aggregate productivity growth from the 
within firms and between firm components of aggregate productivity change. Makin (2008) for 
example, discusses the effect from the weak balance sheets of Japan’s banks, that resulted from 
the collapse of property and asset markets at the beginning of the 1990s, coupled with their 
close alliances with Japanese MNEs. According to this view, loans to firms outside of the 
keiretsu networks were limited, preventing investment in profitable projects such that the rate of 
productivity improvement within firms was too low. Finally, Kwon et al. (2009) return to the 
theme of zombie lending, but to show how this led to resource reallocation towards firms with 
low productivity adding negatively to aggregate productivity growth. 
 
                                                 
5 Nishimura et al. (2005) report that relatively productive firms were closed in Japan in 1996 and 1997, although 
they do not investigate whether these were multinational firms.  In this paper we attempt to discriminate between these different explanations for low 
productivity growth in Japan using micro level data drawn from the Japanese census of 
manufacturing production and focusing on the role played by multinational firms and increased 
globalisation. We begin by decomposing aggregate productivity growth to assess the relative 
contributions from productivity improvements within firms, those which occur from the entry 
and exit of firms and the reallocation of market shares across firms. We find that the weak 
contributions made from the entry/exit and within firm growth components appear to be the 
main contributors to the low aggregate growth.  
 
Using the results from this exercise we then focus in detail on the determinants of these sources 
of productivity change. Within this we include questions prominent within the previous 
literature, but which have so far lacked formal quantitative evidence. This includes issues about 
the characteristics of plants that have been shut by Japanese MNEs. Throughout the exercise we 
compare out results with those found for similar questions for other countries and the previous 
evidence for Japan.  
 
From this we identify a number of aspects of the Japanese economy where behaviour is very 
similar to that for other developed countries, as well as areas where the behaviour is different. 
With respect to the firms and plants that are closed down we find that, as in other country 
contexts, these firms are likely to be small and have low productivity. However, the estimated 
marginal effects are much smaller, a consequence of the very low rates of entry and exit from 
Japanese manufacturing. These low exit rates are at least in part explained by a striking 
difference between Japanese firms and those in other developed countries. Our results suggest 
that increased globalisation, including a measure of increased import competition from low 
wage economies, has had no effect on the entry and exit of firms and plants in Japan. An 
explanation for this result we find little support for is the strict rules on bankruptcy laws and 
‘zombie’ loans, preferring instead an explanation that focuses on the regulations in place that 
prevents the entry of new firms. 
 The low rate of productivity growth in Japan is also often seen as a product of Japanese MNEs 
offshoring production and shutting plants that are relative to others in their industry, high 
productivity. We find that this is true, plants shut by MNEs are relatively more productive than 
the industry average, but they are generally weaker elements of the MNE more generally. This 
behaviour is also not distinct to MNEs. Both MNEs and other multi-plant firms shut weaker 
plants. Indeed the behaviour of these two types of firm is very similar, including again their 
lack of response to increased globalisation.  Finally, our analysis suggests that the rate of 
productivity growth within firms is also partly a consequence of low entry and exit rates. 
Generally we find that the determinants of productivity change are similar to those found for 
other countries, but that productivity improvement is lower in industries in which globalisation 
is higher. The low rate of entry and exit in Japan therefore means that this affects more firms 
than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides an overview of the literature on 
Japan and a history of the rise of manufacturing.  Section 2 describes the data set we use and the 
decomposition of aggregate productivity. In Section 3 we investigate a host of hypotheses and 
report regression results. The questions investigated in this section include the closure of firms, 
of plants and within firm productivity change. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions. 
 
2.    A Brief History of Japanese Manufacturing 
 
From the end of the Second World War the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) has pursued an active industrial policy, designating specific industries as being 
“strategic” (Johnson, 1982). Cowling and Tomlinson (2001) note that policy makers have 
granted direct subsidies, discriminatory tariffs, import restrictions and favourable industry 
regulation to manufacturing industries they note that the machinery sector benefited from these 
interventions due to its strategic designation.  Until 1971 MITI also helped stifle foreign 
competition through tariffs and quotas.  Restrictions were imposed on inflows of foreign direct 
investment to protect infant industries, yet Japanese firms were encouraged to collaborate with 
foreign firms abroad.  
Alongside these favourable government policies, Japanese firms have relied heavily on close 
relationships and co-operation between suppliers (buyers) of their inputs (outputs) to reduce 
costs and satisfy demand.  Consequently there are extensive linkages between upstream and 
downstream firms within an industry in Japan.  This results in specialisation by the majority of 
small keiretsu firms which supply intermediate inputs.  For example, 56% of small Japanese 
firms are involved in some form of subcontracting (Whittaker, 1997).  Production, the supply of 
parts and delivery are coordinated in a horizontal manner (Aoki, 1990).
6  This reduces 
production costs and maintains product quality.
7 The construction of keiretsu networks did not 
just extend to production.  Banking keiretsu were also established to provide finance to 
corporations. According to Aoki (1990) a main bank acts as the principle lender to the company 
and that it is responsible for closely monitoring the company’s business affairs.
8  However, 
despite their financial ties main banks tend not to intervene while the corporation continues to 
make profits.
9 Ordinarily the role of the banking keiretsu was to provide low-cost, long term 
finance.     
 
Keiretsu networks did not arise exogenously, rather they were encouraged by MITI, which 
sought to encourage a system of mass production with large corporations at the centre 
supported by keiretsu sub-contractors (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2001).  As mass production 
flourished, domestic markets became saturated with consumer durables.  Initially corporations 
overcame this by exporting.  However, the resulting large trade surpluses led to retaliatory trade 
barriers.  To overcome these barriers Japanese firms began to locate abroad. 
 
                                                 
6 A product of keiretsu networks is the Just-in-Time (JIT) model of production.  JIT was designed to minimise 
inventories yet respond to daily orders as quickly as possible. 
7 A consequence of these relationships is the geographical concentration of feature of manufacturing industries.  Of 
Japan’s 47 prefectures, 73% of machinery output occurs in 15 prefectures (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2001).   
8 Financial institutions as a whole (including insurance companies) own about 40% of the total outstanding stock 
of listed companies.  However, the main bank has the closest ties with the firm, both in terms of cash-management, 
as well as short term credits. 
9 During crises the main bank would assume responsibility for conducting rescue operations (Aoki, 1990).   Following the relaxation of restrictions on outward FDI flows in 1971, Japanese firms have 
steadily relocated production abroad.  Between 1981 and 1995 $470 billion was invested by 
Japanese firms in foreign affiliates (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2001) an annual average growth 
rate of 22% (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000). Figure 2 demonstrates that this trend has 
continued in the subsequent decade.  By 2004 the number of Japanese establishments located 
abroad was approximately double that found in 1995. The firms that have most vigorously 
embraced the benefits of globalisation were the MNEs around which keiretsu sub-contractors 
orbit. 
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Notes:  Data obtained from http://www.esds.ac.uk/international 
 
The collapse of the Nikkei stock market in 1989 heralded the start of a new era for the Japanese 
economy.  In 1991 property values fell rapidly, growth stagnated and the country experienced 
recessions (1991-1993 and 1998-1999). Deflation became normal.  Arguments on why Japan 
met this fate have been varied. Some commentators have claimed that the Japanese economy 
has been “hollowed out” by multinational firms, taking advantage of the liberalisation of FDI to 
relocate production abroad.   
 
3.   Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity   
The data we use in this paper combines information from the Japanese “Census of 
Manufacturers” and the "Basic survey on Japanese Business Structure and Activities" 
(BSJBSA) conducted annually by METI.  Further details on these datasets can be found in the 
Appendix to this paper. The “Census of Manufacturers” (COM) comprises 169,590 plant-level 
observations from 1994 to 2005 for all establishments with more than 5 employees.
10 A lack of 
data on intangible assets, necessary in the construction of TFP, means we are also forced to 
exclude plants with less than 10 employees from the sample. We use this data to conduct a 
decomposition of aggregate productivity following the methodology outlined in Griliches and 
Regev (1995). This methodology provides the contribution to aggregate productivity growth 
from that within plants, the between component (the reallocation of market share across plants 
in the industry) and that which follows from the entry and exit of plants in the industry. We link 
the COM plant-level data to the BSJBSA firm-level data.  The use of the BSJBSA restricts our 
regression analysis later in the paper to include only firms with more than 50 employees, 
although it is worth noting that the lower limit on plants remains 10 employees.   
 
As already discussed we estimate that the aggregate rate of productivity growth across the 
manufacturing firms within our sample was just 0.5 per cent per annum. This figure lies 
between the estimates for the Japanese economy as a whole of 0.8 per cent per annum (1990-
1995) by Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005), 0.2 per cent per annum (1991-2000) by Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002) and 0.1 per cent (1991-2002) by Ahearne and Shinada (2005).  Decomposing 
this growth suggests that all of the channels have contributed positively to the overall rate of 
productivity growth in Japan. Therefore none has been very fast as a consequence, such that all 
of the channels would appear to be relevant when discussing explanations behind the low rate 
of Japanese productivity growth.  
 
According to Table 1 the majority of this growth, 68 per cent, is contributed by non-MNE 
firms. This is disproportionate to the employment and output shares of such firms: non-MNEs 
account for 49 per cent of employment and 35 per cent of output. In this sense it would also 
                                                 
10 Entry and exit will therefore be defined by movement above and below this level.  seem that any explanation of the slow productivity growth in Japan is also likely to include both 
multinational and non-multinational firms. For both MNEs and non-MNEs aggregate growth 
primarily arose through the reallocations of market share from less productive to more 
productive firms.  This form accounted for 82 per cent of productivity growth, or an average 
annual rate of 0.83 per cent per annum. Of interest this rate of growth is comparable to that 
reported for the US in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), which might be used to suggest 
that within firm and entry and exit are the main sources for slow growth in Japan relative to that 
found in other developed countries.  
 
In support of this view, and in contrast to the fears of hollowing out through the closure of firms 
and plant, the effect of closure accounted for just 1% of total productivity growth. This, as 
Ahearne and Shinada (2005) and The Economist (2004, 2009) suggested, and as we show in 
more detail below would appear to be explained largely by the very low rate of entry and exit 
that occurred within Japanese manufacturing.  Finally, the contribution from within plant 
productivity growth was just 14 per cent, on average.  To provide some context to this figure, 
Haltiwanger (1997) found within plant productivity changes in manufacturing industries 
generated 54% of aggregate U.S. productivity improvements between 1977 and 1987.  For 
Israel, Griliches and Regev (1995) found the figure to be 83% for the years 1979-88. 
 
The decompositions we present also broadly support those presented by Ahearne and Shinada 
(2005) using data on firms listed on the Japanese stock exchanges on an industry-by-industry 
basis. While there are differences across sectors, they calculate that for the construction, 
wholesale and retailing industries in Japan that the between component of aggregate 
productivity growth was negative, while it was close to zero in most manufacturing sectors. 
 
In the next section of the paper we explore the determinants of the different elements of 
aggregate productivity, starting with the question of why the rate of exit is very low in Japan 
and whether this is explained by the actions of MNEs or of the forces of globalisation. We 
separate this question into two parts. The first compares the closure of single and multi-plant 
firms in a single framework. We then consider the question of which plants within a firm are singled out for closure. The final section considers the rate of productivity growth within firms. 
Given the comparability with the contributions to overall productivity growth found in the US 
we choose to exclude the between component from further analysis.  
 
Table 1: Multinational and non-MNE Plant Productivity Decompositions
Productivity Component Obs Rate % Contributed by MNEs
Average Annual Productivity Growth Rate 143725 0.5%
Of which
Within Plant 143725 .14 28.6
Between Plant 143725 .83 32.5
Plant Entry 143725 .01 0.0
Plant Exit 143725 .02 50.0
Notes: Multinational components include domestic and foreign multinationals 
 
 
4.   Empirical Results 
 
Question 1:  What causes the closure of Japanese firms and plants? 
 
We identify exit from the sample using the unique identification number given to all firms and 
their plants.  A firm/plant is deemed to have entered when it is observed at time t but was not 
observed in the dataset in the previous period, t-1.  Equivalently, a firm/plant that exits is one 
that was observed at t-1, but not at time t.  In Table 2 we report the rate of entry and exit within 
each year for the total sample and for MNEs, and for single and multi-plant non-MNEs. 
Throughout the sample there are 2,330 instances of entry and 3,392 observations of exit, with a median rate of exit of 1 per cent per annum.
11 The low rate of entry and exit is consistent with 
the high average age of firms in the sample, which is over 40 years. We use this to suggest that 
the low rate of exit is not a consequence of the size threshold imposed on the Japanese census 
data at 3 employees. It also suggests that low entry and exit rates have been a feature of the 
Japanese economy for a very long period of time, and are therefore unlikely to be the reason 
that productivity growth declined in Japan after the ‘golden age’. Finally, in contrast to any 
argument they are a consequence of some form of active industrial policy in Japan, it is worth 
noting that they are a feature of the data that also holds across industries. 
 
 
This rate of exit is much lower than that found for other developed countries. For the US 
Bernard and Jensen (2004) calculate 32 per cent of plants are shut over a 5 year period. Indeed 
the rate of churn (entry plus exit) in Japan is most similar to that found for small, open 
developed countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Sweden rather than the typical large 
developed country. According to the Eurostat FEED
12 dataset the lowest rate of churn amongst 
European countries is 5.7 per cent in Switzerland, 9.3 per cent in Sweden and 9.7 per cent in 
Austria. For France, Germany and the UK the comparable figures are 11, 17 and 18 per cent 
respectively.  Low entry and exit rates in smaller countries is usually explained as a result of the 
open nature of their economies, resulting in severe left truncating of the productivity 
distribution in a Melitz (2003) type of framework. A consequence of this is the high share of 
exporters in the total population of firms. Greenaway et al. (2008a) report for Sweden that 
exporters account for over 80 per cent of the total number of firms. In our data the proportion of 
exporters is around 30 per cent, a figure it is worth noting is likely to be biased upwards 
because export information is available only for firms with more than 50 employees. Severe left 
truncating of the productivity distribution would not therefore appear to be a likely source of 
low entry and exit rates in Japan. 
 
                                                 
11 These are line with the evidence for Japan reported in Caballero et al. (2003), Peek and Rosengren (2003) and 
Ahearne and Shinada (2005). 
12 Eurostat Firm Entry and Exit Data Dimensions. Table 2: Annual Entry and Exit Rates
    Complete Sample              MNE                     Multi (ex. MNE)        Single Plant
Year Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit
1994 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1995 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1996 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
1997 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
1998 .03 .03 .02 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
1999 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03
2000 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03
2001 .01 .03 .01 .03 .02 .03 .01 .03
2002 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03
2003 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
2004 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02
2005 .02 - .02 - .02 - .02 -
 
Entry and exit rates vary across firm types, with the highest rates identified in multi-plant firms 
and multinationals. While these rates of exit are low when compared to other countries, that 
they are higher relative to those found for single plant firms might explain why the rate of 
closure of plants is seen by commentators within Japan as high, although some cultural aversion 
to exit would be needed to claim that these are excessive. That the rate of exit is higher for 
multi-plant firms would appear consistent with the explanation of corporate restricting by large 
Japanese firms as a result of their over-expansion in the 1980s by Kimura and Fuji (2003) or 
alternatively of offshoring of the production of intermediate inputs by Japanese multinationals.  
 
As multi-plant and multinational firms are typically larger and more productive than single 
plant firms it would also appear consistent with the argument made in Nishimura et al. (2005) 
that this could have acted as drag on aggregate productivity growth.  We explore this point in 
Table 3 below where we report the average productivity of plants according to their ownership 
and if they exit alongside the averages for firms of different types as a whole. As expected, the 
table shows that on average plants owned by MNEs are some 7 per cent more productive than 
the average plant within the same industry and some 10 per cent more productive than the 
average non-MNE plant. It would also seem that, conditional on their ownership, plants that 
exit have lower average productivity compared to those that remain. In the case of MNE plants 
this difference is small at 1 per cent, but it is larger for non-MNE plants at 4 per cent. The table 
also confirms the view that the plants shut by MNEs are relatively productive compared to 
other plants in the same industry and could therefore contribute negatively to aggregate productivity growth. Plants shut by MNEs are on average 6 per cent more productive than the 
average plant in the same industry.  
 
Table 3: Average Plant Productivity 
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Average Plant Productivity 169590 .96 .35 -4.81 4.36
Average Plant Productivity if Owned by:
   Multiplant Multinational 41690 1.03 .40 -4.81 4.36
   Single Plant Multinational 11638 .99 .35 -2.39 3.83
   Domestic Multiplant Firm 41998 .93 .36 -3.66 4.30
   Single Plant Domestic Firm 74264 .92 .30 -4.34 3.68
Average Exiting Plant Productivity if Owned by:
   Multiplant Multinational 1142 1.02 .51 -2.26 4.36
   Single Plant Multinational 174 1.02 .57 -1.03 3.83
   Domestic Multiplant Firm 1237 .88 .51 -2.85 4.30
   Single Plant Domestic Firm 839 .90 .47 -2.12 3.44
 
 
What are the factors that explain which plants and firms are shut in Japan? In Table 4 we 
investigate the determinants of plant closure using a probit regression. In so doing we build on 
prior evidence for Japanese manufacturing found in Kimura and Fujii (2003) and Kimura and 
Kiyota (2006), which we extend to consider the role of firm and industry import penetration, 
the multinational status of the firm and industry sunk costs. We group the dependent variables 
into plant, firm and industry level determinants of exit. The plant level variables include 
measures of size (employment), capital intensity, TFP and average wage. Summary statistics of 
these variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The firm level variables capture the 
R&D intensity of the firm, its ownership (whether it is a foreign owned firm), and the extent of 
its engagement with global markets (whether it exports, imports or owns affiliates abroad). The 
industry level measures attempt to capture the effects of globalisation on the probability of 
survival more generally and are measured by import penetration and intra-industry trade.  
 
The results from Table 4 suggest that the type of plants that are closed in Japan are similar to 
those found to exit in other countries. We find that the probability of exit is decreasing in the size, capital intensity and TFP of the plant and increasing in the average wage. This matches 
evidence reported in Dunne et al. (1989), Görg and Strobl (2003), Mata and Portugal (1994), 
Bernard and Sjoholm (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2007) for other OECD countries and Kimura 
and Fujii (2003) for Japan.  The table suggests however, that the effect of these variables on the 
probability of exit is very small, an artefact of the low rate of exit in the sample.  A one 
standard deviation in plant size, capital intensity or TFP decreases the probability of exit by just 
0.50, 0.09 and 0.05 percentage points
13.   
 
We find a more limited role for firm characteristics in determining exit. There are reasons to 
believe that that a firm’s R&D expenditure may affect the markets in which a firm operates.  
Perez et al. (2004) for Spain find that R&D intensity lowers the hazard rate, while Kimura and 
Kiyota (2003) find similar evidence for Japanese firms.  However, the direction of the 
relationship is not obvious.  Since R&D is associated with uncertainty firms with high R&D 
intensities or which operate in R&D intensive sectors may face a higher risk of failure.  This 
has been found by Audretsch and Mahmod (1995), Audretsch et al. (2000) and Segarra and 
Callejon (2002).  Conditional on the plant variables we find no effect from R&D intensity of 
the firm in the probability of exit. This result occurs as a result of the above average 
characteristics of firms that conduct R&D however. When we exclude the plant variables from 
the regression we find that firm R&D intensity reduces the probability of exit by 0.07 
percentage points.   
 
We also find in Table 4 initial evidence that offshoring may play a role in firm closure. 
Conditional on the plant, firm and industry variables, importing firms are 0.03 percentage 
points more likely to close their plants. Offshoring as an explanation for plant closure might 
also explain the significance of the indicators of the MNE status of the firm in the regression. In 
regression 1 we find that plants belonging to domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs are more 
likely to exit, with a stronger effect found for domestic MNE status.
 14  This latter effect occurs 
                                                 
13 If the probability of exit was initially 5 percent (0.05) then a one standard deviation increase in plant size would 
reduce it to 0.045 
14 We measure foreign ownership as a binary variable equal to 1 if more than 50 percent of the firm’s capital is 
foreign owned and zero otherwise The 50% threshold is also used by Görg and Strobl (2002).  The results are despite the low levels of foreign presence of foreign firms within Japan. Of the 53,328 
observations of plants owned by a multinational, only 761 observations relate to plants owned 
by a foreign multinational.  Also of interest, we find that the behaviour of multinational firms is 
distinct from that of multi-plant firms more generally, which also have a higher probability of 
exit conditional on their firm and plant characteristics. If plant closure is due to the pace of 
entry into new products and markets during the 1980s, the pattern of its reversal is different 
between multinationals and non-multinationals.  
 
The behaviour of MNEs is again not inconsistent with that found for multinationals in other 
countries, where the effect of foreign ownership on the probability of survival has been found to 
be somewhat mixed. Using panel data on Chilean manufacturing plants, Alvarez and Görg 
(2005) find that foreign ownership has a positive effect on exit, but only during the significant 
recession of the late 1990s, while Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) find that conditional on their 
greater size and labour productivity, foreign plants are more likely to exit in Indonesia.  Mata 
and Portugal (2002) in contrast find that conditional on firm characteristics, being foreign has 
no effect on the probability of exit in Portugal, while Ozler and Taymaz (2004) fail to find any 
difference in survival prospects between foreign and native firms for Turkey.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
robust to either the International Monetary Fund’s definition of foreign ownership at the 25% level, or, to including 
the absolute percentage of capital which is foreign held (which may take a value between 0 and 100). Table 4: Plant, Firm and Industry Determinants of Exit
       Regression
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Plant Variables
Size -.47*** -1.28*** .27***
(-31.34) (-28.48) (-34.13)
Capital Intensity -.11*** -.24*** .80***
(-9.74) (-8.60) (-9.92)
TFP -.05*** -.31*** .73***
(-5.32) (-3.72) (-4.94)
Wages .12*** .65*** 1.95***
(8.78) (5.95) (8.45)
Firm Variables
Export Dummy .01 .01 1.01
(.44) (.08) (.21)
Import Dummy .03** .18*** 1.17**
(2.37) (2.60) (2.38)
Firm Exports .06*** .00*** 1.00***
(3.12) (5.62) (4.58)
Firm Imports .02 .00** 1.00
(1.16) (2.09) (1.44)
R&D Intensity .02 .01** 1.00
(1.36) (2.23) (1.28)
Domestic MNE Dummy .10*** .53*** 1.62***
(7.95) (7.29) (7.85)
Foreign MNE Dummy .02** 1.04** 2.54***
(2.09) (2.23) (2.82)
Multiplant Dummy .20*** .92*** 2.35***
(19.18) (15.97) (16.75)
Industry Variables
Grubel-Lloyd Index -.02 -.11 .90
(-.39) (-.62) (-.74)
LWPEN .01 -.08 1.01
(.19) (-.61) (.07)
OTHPEN -.06 .07 .91
(-.77) (.30) (-.54)
Sunk Costs -.03*** -.05** .96***
(-2.67) (-2.38) (-2.84)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 131559 15672 131669
R
2 .15 - -
 
Notes: Standardised coefficients in regressions 1-4. Logit coefficients in regression 5 and hazard 
ratios in regression 6. Z-scores clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Industry 
dummies are defined at the three-digit level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels. 
 
The most striking difference in the behaviour of Japanese firms with that found for other 
countries comes with respect to the industry level measures of globalisation. In other contexts 
greater industry level exposure to global markets has been found to be a cause of firm and plant death, see for example Bernard et al. (2006) and Greenaway et al. (2008). Greater exposure to 
foreign competition in industries in which the country has a comparative disadvantage leads to 
the closure of production plants. For Japan we find no such effects, irrespective of the source of 
that import competition. This is somewhat unexpected given that the measures of firm level 
imports were found to significantly affect the likelihood of exit. Firms that offshore, they 
import or own affiliates abroad, are significantly more likely to exit than other types of firms, 
but the greater levels of import penetration within the industry more generally has no effect on 
the likelihood of exit.  
 
One explanation might be that import penetration levels in Japan are low and some threshold 
level is required to be reached before it affects plant closure. Such a view does not have strong 
support. While import penetration rates are lower in Japan compared to other OECD countries 
they are not drastically lower. Over the sample, on average, imports from low wage countries 
account for about 9 percent of production.  In comparison, Bernard et al. (2006) report for the 
US that aggregate import penetration rises from 15 percent to 28 percent between 1977 to 1997. 
Moreover, the level of import penetration from low wage economies is more similar between 
these two countries. In the US import penetration from low wage economies increased from 2 
percent to 6 percent whereas in our sample it doubled to 4 percent between 1994 and 2002.   
 
Of the industry variables, only industry sunk costs are found to have a significant effect on exit. 
This supports evidence from Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988, 1989), Bernard and Jensen 
(2007) for the US, Geroski (1991a,b) for the UK and Greenaway et al. (2008) for Sweden.
15   
According to our estimates a one standard deviation increase in industry sunk costs reduces exit 
by 3 percentage points.  In industries with high sunk costs potential entrants must draw a high 
productivity so that they may profitably produce (Hopenhayn, 1992; Melitz, 2003). 
Consequently there are fewer successful entrants and incumbents face a lower probability of 
exit.   
                                                 
15 We do not consider the question of whether sunk-costs and exit are correlated with entry into the Japanese 
manufacturing sector (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988, 1989), or indeed whether there is a net rate of entry 
or exit into the industry.  
This result points to the role of entry as an unexplored determinant of low exit rates in Japan. 
Strict bankruptcy laws, government regulation and ‘zombie’ lending by banks to relatively 
unproductive firms have been used to explain low rates of exit, however without similar 
restrictions on the ability of new firms to enter the market it is not clear why the rate of new 
entry would also be low. In support of this view, and of surprise given the discussion in the 
previous literature on the difficulties in closing firms, according to the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business Indicators Japan ranks as the country in which the costs of closing a business 
(measured as the recovery rate in bankruptcy) are lowest out of the 183 countries that make up 
the sample.  For comparison the UK is ranked number 9, the US at 15, Germany at 35 and 
France at 42. In contrast Japan’s ranking in the ease of opening a new business in that dataset is 
91 (out of 183) in between Mexico and Uzbekistan. For this measure the US lies at number 8, 
the UK at 16, France at 22 and Germany at 84. 
 
In the remaining regressions of the table we consider the robustness of those findings to 
different estimation techniques. The number of observations of exit in the sample is low.  King 
and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) demonstrate that logit and probit models can lead to an under-
estimation of the probability of rare events, and as the event becomes rarer in an increasingly 
dysfunctional manner.  Regression 2 in Table 3 repeats the regression in column 1 but follows 
the methodology outlined by King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) to correct the standard errors for 
rare events.  The King and Zeng method works by choosing a random sample of the 0’s (non-
exit in the current context), estimating a logit regression and then correcting the coefficients and 
standard errors post-estimation (using information on the proportion of 1’s in the population).  
Their general suggestion is to choose between 2-5 times the numbers of 0’s and 1’s.  As a 
second robustness test we use a Cox proportional hazard model rather than a probit estimator.  
Non-parametric estimators have proved popular in the plant exit literature with Mata and 
Portugal (2002) and Bandick (2007) employing them to describe the survival rates of Swedish 
multinational owned, and Spanish, plants. 
 
The results in regression 2 and 3 of Table 3 are robust to this change.  We continue to find that 
large, capital intensive, productive plants with low wage costs are less likely to exit.  The firm-level variables are also unchanged.  Intensive importers and exporters are more likely to close 
plants, as are multinationals and multiplant firms.  Exporting status and firm R&D intensity 
remain insignificant.  Sunk costs continue to be the sole significant industry-level determinant 
of exit.   
 
Question 2:  What are the Causes of Exit within Multiplant Firms? 
 
From Table 4 it is clear that firms that are small, have low productivity, low capital intensity 
etc. have a greater probability of closing down. However we also find that the effect of these 
variables is small and that both multi-plant and multinational firms have a greater probability of 
exit. Motivated by that later result in this section we focus on the type of plants that are shut by 
multinational firms and those multi-plant firms that have no overseas affiliates. 
 
We now measure the plant variables relative to the firm average.  For example, the size ratio is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of plant employees divided by the number of 
people employed by the firm.  Similar variables are constructed for capital intensity and wages.  
Since multiplant firms may have operations in several industries, such that plant and firm TFP 
are not comparable, we choose to drop this variable from the regression. The remaining control 
variables are similar to those included in Table 4. To these we add a measure of the capital 
intensity and material intensity of the plant relative to the firm, which we use to capture the 
vulnerability of plants to being shut and their production offshored. These variables are 
measured as: 
 









t ensity capital firm average
ensity capital plant
CAP Plant Firm
int _ _ _
int _ _
log _ _  
 









t ensity material firm average
ensity material plant
MAT Plant Firm
int _ _ _
int _ _
log _ _   
Finally, we explore the Kimura and Fujii (2003) hypothesis that plant closure in the 1990s 
reflected the excessive growth of large Japanese firms in the 1980s. We capture this effect using 
a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if the plant operates in the same 3-digit 
industry as the firm (and zero otherwise).   
 
Table 5: Within Multiplant Firm Regressions
Regression
Variable (4) (5)














Same Industry Dummy .00 -.01
(.09) (-.29)
Firm-level Variables
Export Dummy .02 -.04*
(.71) (-1.83)
Import Dummy .01 .01
(.50) (.68)
Firm Exports -.10** -.06**
(-2.51) (-2.22)
Firm Imports -.05 -.01
(-1.27) (-1.08)
R&D Intensity -.07*** -.14***
(-4.11) (-6.74)
Industry-level Variables
















Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Number of Observations 30688 31645
Pseudo R
2 .15 .11
 Notes: Standardised coefficients in all regressions. Z-scores clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses. Industry dummies are defined at the three-digit level. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
Regression 4 reports the results for multinational firms and regression 5 for multi-plant firms 
without overseas affiliates.
 16 We label these for ease as multi-plant firms. In many aspects the 
type of plants shut by these two types of firm are very similar, indeed it is not obvious from 
these results as to why multinationals have been singled out as the main cause of hollowing out 
in Japan.  Conditional on unobserved 3 digit industry fixed effects for the firm and for the plant, 
the results of regression 4 show that multinational plants that are large relative to the firm are 
less likely to exit, as are more capital intensive plants. These are the same types of plant that are 
less vulnerable to closure within multi-plant firms. The effects of size and capital intensity are 
also similar for multinational and multi-plant firms, indeed we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
multinationals and multi-plant firm react identically to the same change in size or capital 
intensity when we pool the observations into a single regression. A one standard deviation 
increase in the size ratio reduces the exit probability by 0.44 percentage points for multinational 
firms and by 0.31 percentage points for multi-plant firms.  For the capital intensity ratio the 
comparative values are 0.10 percentage points and 0.15 percentage points.  We also find for 
both types of firm no evidence that those plants that lie within a different 3-digit industry to the 
firm are more vulnerable to exit. Increased focus on the core activities of the firm does not 
appear to have been a significant driver of exit over this time period. 
 
The differences in the determinants of plant closure instead relate primarily to the variables that 
capture motives for offshoring. There is evidence from regression 4 that MNEs are more likely 
to shut high cost plants for example. A one standard deviation increase in the plant-to-firm 
wage ratio increases the probability of plant exit by 0.08 percentage points. For multi-plant-
firms this factor was not important, perhaps reflecting the need under just-in-time delivery to be 
close to final producers.  We also find that MNEs shut plants based on the capital and material 
                                                 
16 The MNE firms include a small number of foreign multinationals. In regression 1 of Appendix Table A5 we re-
run the MNE regressions but only include domestic MNEs.  The results are not substantively different to the MNE 
results in Table 5.  In regression 2 of Appendix Table A5 we test for differences in the coefficients between 
domestic and foreign multinationals.  No statistically significant differences are found at conventional levels. intensity of the plant.  MNEs are significantly less likely to shut plants that are capital and 
material intensive, which we take to mean further along the production chain relative to the rest 
of the firm. The effect of these variables is of a similar size to those for the other plant 
characteristics. A one standard deviation increase in the relative capital intensity of the plant’s 
industry relative to the industry of the firm reduces exit by 0.15 percentage points.  For relative 
material intensity the value is 0.11 percentage points.  Finally, we find for both multinational 
and multi-plant firms whether the firm imports or not is not a good predictor of the plants that 
are shut. This might occur because this variable is measured at the level of the firm, although, 
given that we find that the export status of the firm does affect the likelihood the firm will shut 
plants, perhaps a better explanation is that offshoring and importing of inputs are not identical 
concepts. 
 
Consistent with the results in Table 3 we continue to find no role for the globalisation variables 
within the regression. The level and the structure of trade have no effect on the volume of plant 
exit within Japan. Given the contrast between these results and those found for other OECD 
countries again suggests some common institutional factors that limits the amount of exit (or 
entry) that occurs.  
 
Why is the rate of TFP growth within firms so low? 
 
Table 1 suggests that within plant productivity growth to be one of the key restraints on 
aggregate productivity growth in Japan.  Using a model similar to that in Griffith et al. (2003) 
we investigate the determinants of productivity growth within plants.  A similar model is used 
by Bernard and Jones (1996) to investigate productivity convergence in industries across 14 
OECD countries.  The model begins with a neoclassical production technology, 
          ( 4 )  
F
jt ijt KA A =
where i represents a given plant, j indexes the industry in which the plant operates and t denotes 
time.  Aijt represents plant productivity, K is a shift parameter and A  represents Total Factor 
F
jt AProductivity (TFP) at the frontier plant.  A general dynamic relationship between plant and 
frontier productivity may be expressed as, 




jt ijt A A A A ε α β β β + + + + = − − 1 1 1 2 1 0 ln
To arrive at the error correction model we must see when (5) would be consistent with (4).  
This requires that all factors which would cause divergence from equilibrium are equal to zero.  
Through rearranging (5) we obtain the error correction model, 




jt ijt A A A A ε γ β β + − + Δ + = Δ − − 1 1 1 0 ln ln ln ln  (6) 
The terms on the right hand side capture the effect of productivity transfer.  The term   
allows plant productivity growth to depend directly upon productivity growth at the frontier 
plant.  The frontier is assumed   the  P in plant igit 
industry at time t.  Plant product  grow lso de s on  far th ant lie hind 
frontier.  The larger is 
F
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productivity convergence.  
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We then estimate the relationship posited above using OLS.  A full set of time dummy variables 
are included to capture the effect of macroeconomic and stochastic shocks on productivity.  The 
results show that Japanese plants behave in similar fashion to those in other countries.  As in 
Griffith et al. (2003) we find a positive an gnificant effect of the growth in the frontier 
establishment on non-frontier plant’s productivity growth.  In regression 1 of Table 6 a one 
standard deviation increase in productivity at the frontier establish tage 
point increase in plant i's productivity growth.  As in the United Kingdom there is also evidence 
of productivity convergence.  Plants operating behind the productivity frontier have, on 
average, 31 percentage points highe roducti  growt  
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 Notes: Standardised coefficients. Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
In regressions 7 to 11 we examine the effect imports, intra-industry trade and firm R&D 
intensity have on plant-level productivity growth.  International trade has been shown 
elsewhere to affect productivity (see for example Keller and Yeaple, 2003 for evidence from the 
United States).  Of interest here, given the earlier results for the closure of firms and plants, we 
find import penetration to be a negative determinant of within plant productivity growth.  A one 
standard deviation increase in imports from low-wage countries reduces plant productivity 
growth by 0.16 percentage points.  Imports from other countries have a smaller effect: the 
coefficient estimate is -0.10.  Building on the evidence above that import penetration has not 
had a strong effect on the exit of firms or plants this would suggest that more firms have lower 
productivity growth because of increased import penetration than might otherwise have been 
the case.  The industrial structure of Japan would appear to be part of the explanation behind the 
low rate of productivity improvement within Japanese firms.   
 
Intra-industry trade is not a significant determinant of productivity growth but we find that a 
one standard deviation increase in firm R&D intensity raises the productivity of its plants by 5 
percentage points.  When all four variables and their interactions with the TFP Gap variable are 
included in column 7 we continue to find that low-wage imports reduce productivity growth 
while firm R&D intensity increases it.  However, the variable measuring imports from other 
countries is now insignificant but the coefficient on intra-industry trade estimate of 0.07 is 
robust.  We now observe that intra-industry trade and imports from other countries reduce the 
speed of convergence by 4 and 8 percentage points, respectively.  In spite of these findings we 
continue to find convergence in TFP.  The elasticity on the TFP Gap variable (0.09) implies that 
the half life of the productivity gap between the average frontier productivity and the average 
plant productivity is 7.7 years.  This is a fairly rapid rate of productivity growth and suggests 
that the reason for the low rate of within plant change is not explained by a low elasticity on the 
TFP Gap variable rather country-specific factors are responsible. 
 
5.  Conclusions  
This paper examines the role of MNEs and globalisation in Japanese productivity performance 
from 1994 to 2005. In so doing we attempt to understand which of the explanations for low 
productivity growth during its so called ‘lost decade’ have greatest support.  In many aspects of 
behaviour we find that Japanese firms are similar to those found in other developed countries. 
This includes the type of firms and plants that are closed and the determinants of within firm 
productivity change. The areas of greatest difference appear to stem principally from the low 
rate of entry and exit, which is itself partly explained at least by the lack of an effect from 
import competition. The increased share of consumption accounted for by goods from low 
wage economies has not significantly affected the rate of rate at which firms are closed. In this 
sense increased globalisation is not the cause of Japan’s economic problems, although given the 
evidence from other countries perhaps the more relevant question is why not. The evidence 
points to the low entry and exit rates as at least part of the answer. Even where we find a 
negative effect from globalisation on productivity changes within firms, the number of firms 
this affects is greater because of low entry and exit rates.  
 
The literature has focused on the strict bankruptcy laws in Japan. It is of some surprise then that 
according to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Indicators Japan ranks as the country in 
which the costs of closing a business (measured as the recovery rate in bankruptcy) are lowest 
out of the 183 countries that make up the sample.  It is however relatively more difficult to open 
a business: Japan’s ranking in the ease of opening a new business in that dataset is 91 (out of 
183) in between Mexico and Uzbekistan. The role of low entry rates in Japan is worthy of 
future attention. 
 
We find some evidence that supports the view that Japanese multinationals are a cause of its 
low productivity growth. The closure of plants by MNEs that are relatively productive 
compared to others within the same industry did serve as a drag on overall productivity growth. 
However, these exit rates, while high compared to single plant firms, are low by international 
standards and this behaviour is not very different from that found for multi-plant firms without 
foreign affiliates. Why multinational firms have therefore been singled out for criticism is not clear, although we do find evidence that the pattern of closure is consistent with the production 
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The data we use in this paper is from the Japanese “Census of Manufacturers” and the "Basic 
survey on Overseas Business Activities" conducted annually by METI.  The “Census of 
Manufacturers” comprises 169,590 plant-level observations from 1994 to 2005. This 
longitudinal plant data set covers all establishments with more than 4 employees. 
Establishments with less than 10 employees do not report information on tangible assets, 
necessary for estimating TFP. This places a restriction on the plants that are included in the 
regression when investigating the causes of productivity change in Section 3 and should be born 
in mind when interpreting the results generated.  Information is provided on the three-digit 
industry in which a plant operates
17.  The plant-level variables include size (measured by the 
number of employees), capital per worker, sales, TFP (measured relative to the industry and in 
logs), wage rates and the volume of intermediate inputs used.  Summary statistics of the plant-
level variables are provided in Table A1. 
 
Table A1: The Plant-Level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capital 169590 5119 23240 .07 1052705
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Exit 169590 .02 .14 0 1
   1 if the plant exits
Entry 169590 .01 .11 0 1
   1 if the plant enters
Intermediate Inputs 169590 6669 39879 .10 4276681
   Millions of Japanese Yen
Plant Size 169590 225 489 10 21309
   Number of Employees
Sales 169590 11321 54454 2.88 5855928
   Millions of Japanese Yen
TFP 169590 .96 .35 -4.81 4.36
   Total Factor Productivity
Wages 169590 4.84 1.79 .03 90.55
   Millions of Japanese Yen
 
                                                 
17 A list of industries is included in Appendix Table A4 This data on plants is matched with that on firms from the "Basic survey on Overseas Business 
Activities" also conducted annually by METI.  Firms with less than 50 employees are not 
required to submit information. Again this restricts the firms that can be used within the more 
formal econometric analysis. From this dataset we draw information on firm age, size, capital-
labour ratios, whether it has multiple plants and whether the firm has any overseas investments 
(FDI).  Summary statistics of the firm-level variables are shown in Table A2. 
 
Table A2: The Firm-Level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 114334 43 15.77 0 161
   In years
Size 114334 501 2056 50 80500
   Number of workers
Capital per Worker 114334 15.74 26.42 .00 2151
   Millions of Japanese yen
Firm TFP 114334 .97 .15 -3.53 2.80
   Total Factor Productivity
R&D Complexity 114334 .01 .03 0 6.84
  R&D divided by firm sales
Intermediate Inputs 114334 20100 133073 1 8210527
   Millions of Japanese yen
Foreign Ownership Dummy 114334 .01 .09 0 1
   1 if foreign firm holds more than 50% of capital
FDI 114334 .20 .40 0 1
   1 if outward loans and investment >0
Multiplant Dummy 114334 .25 .43 0 1
   1 if the firm has more than one plant
Export Dummy 114334 .31 .46 0 1
   1 if the firm exports
Import Dummy 114334 .26 .44 0 1
   1 if the firm imports
 
The manufacturing establishments are split into 48 industries and TFP is calculated for each 
plant relative to the industry average.  Following Good et al. (1997) and Aw et al. (1997), we 
define the TFP level of establishment p in year t in a certain industry in comparison with the 
TFP level of a hypothetical representative establishment in year 0 in that industry as follows 
  
() ( )( )







− + − − +












it ift t ft pt
X X S S Q Q











   (1) 
 
where Qft, Sift and Xift denote the gross output of plant f in year t, the cost share of factor i for 
establishment p’s input of factor i in year t.  Variables with an upper bar denote the industry 
average of that variable.  We use 1994 as the base year.  Capital, labour and real intermediate 
inputs are used as factor inputs.   
The representative establishment for each industry is defined as a hypothetical establishment 
whose gross output as well as input and cost share of all production factors are identical with 
the industry average.  The first two terms on the right hand side of equation (1) denote the gap 
between plant f’s TFP level in year t and the representative establishment’s TFP level in year t 
and the representative establishment’s TFP level in the base year.  lnTFPft in equation (1) 
constitutes the gap between establishment f’s TFP level in year t and the representative 




In the empirical section we investigate how both firm and industry level variables affect the 
decision to close a plant.  Globalisation has been shown to cause exit.  The source of import 
competition in the US affects plant survival and causes firms to adjust their product mix 
(Bernard and Jensen, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006).  We disaggregate import penetration into low-
wage import penetration (LWPEN) and import penetration from all other countries 
(OTHPEN)
18.  These measures are calculated as: 
 
                                                 
18 Countries are deemed to be low-wage where they have a GDP less than 5% that of Japan. it it it
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where LWPENit represents low-wage country import competition in industry i at time t, Mit
LW is 
the value of imports from low-wage countries in industry i at time t, Mit  and Xit represents the 
value of total imports and exports in industry i at time t and Yit denotes output in industry i 
during year t.  OTHPENit denotes imports from all countries except low-wage economies. 
 
Bernard et al. (2006) find that both forms of import competition raise the probability of closure.  
A one standard deviation increase in LWPEN increases the probability of plant exit by 2.2 
percentage points which is considerably greater than the effect of OTHPEN.  Similar results are 
found by Greenaway et al. (2008b) for Sweden.  In their results, the estimated coefficient on 
imports from outside the OECD is twice as large as that for OECD imports.  Both sources of 
competition have a positive and significant effect on closure. 
 
Intra-industry trade is often found to have a positive effect upon firm exit.  As international 
trade grows firms diversify their product range which may lead them to enter new industries 
and exit sectors they operate in currently.  It has been established by Greenaway et al. (2008b) 
that firms do not just closedown their operations, they switch to new industries too.  Using 
Swedish manufacturing data they find that intra-industry trade leads to exit through plant 
closure, and, mergers and acquisition.  This is also found by Bernard et al. (2006) for the United 
States, firms which are confronted by low-wage import competition sometimes switch to more 
capital intensive sectors. 
 
Our measure of intra-industry trade is constructed using the Grubel-Lloyd index 
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where GLijt is the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in industry i in year t, Xi are 
exports in industry i during year t and Mit are imports in industry i during year t. 
  
The industry variables mentioned so far capture the influence of globalisation upon plant exit.  
We also include a measure of sunk costs.  The empirical literature has identified sunk costs as 
being an important factor in shaping exit.  For example, Aw et al. (2002) find that the nature of 
sunk costs result in very different productivity distributions in South Korea and Taiwan.  Sunk 
costs also play a key role in determining exporting behaviour (Roberts and Tybout, 1997).   
 
Since exit rates tend to be highly correlated with the sunk costs of entry and exit we use the 
same measure as Bernard and Jensen (2002) and Greenaway et al. (2008b).  For each industry 
and year, sunk costs are calculated as the minimum of either the entry or exit rate.  In steady-
state equilibrium, entry and exit rates should be equal and should vary with sunk costs.  An 
increase in sunk costs would mean that the entry rate should fall, in equilibrium.  However, to 
focus solely on entry rates could be misleading as an industry characterised by high sunk costs 
could experience a high entry rate due to high expected profits.  By using the minimum of entry 
or exit, we circumvent this problem. 
 
Summary statistics for the industry-level variables are provided in Table 8.  Intra-industry trade 
accounts for approximately half of all trade over the sample.  Sunk costs have an average value 
of 1 percent, that is, the average of the minimum of the entry and exit rates in an industry is 1 
percent of the total number of operating plants.  Imports represent 9% of Japanese output with a 
third of this coming from low-wage countries. 
 Table A3: Industry-level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Grubel-Lloyd Index 157273 .50 .26 .01 1.00
   Trade that is intra-industry
Sunk Costs 169590 .01 .01 .00 .05
   Minimum of entry and exit rates
Import Penetration 131669 .09 .09 .00 .67
   Imports divided by apparent consumption
LWPEN 131669 .03 .05 .00 .28
   Low-wage imports
OTHPEN 131669 .06 .06 .00 .55






Miscellaneous electrical machinery equipment
Miscellaneous fabricated metal products
Miscellaneous food and related products
Miscellaneous food and related products
Miscellaneous iron and steel
Miscellaneous machinery
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Motor vehicle parts and accessories
Motor vehicles
Non-ferrous metal products






Pig iron and crude steel
Plastic products
Pottery
Precision machinery and equipment
Prepared animal foods and organ fertilizers
Printing, plate making for printing and bookbinding
paper, and coated and glazed paper
Rubber products
ood products
iconductor devices and integrated circuits





 Table A5: Domestic MNEs
Regression
Variable (1) (2)














Same Industry Dummy .00 -.06
(.11) (-.35)
Firm-level Variables
Export Dummy .02 1.20
(.79) (1.22)
Import Dummy .01 .96
(.60) (.90)
Firm Exports -.10** -1.20
(-2.48) (-1.35)
Firm Imports -.05 -1.12
(-1.28) (-1.09)
R&D Intensity -.08*** 1.32
(-4.31) (1.22)
Industry-level Variables
















Domestic Multinational Dummy .12
(.40)












   x Same Industry Dummy .06
(.36)
   x Export Dummy -.58
(-.57)
   x Import Dummy -.49
(-.45)
   x Firm Exports .53
(.60)
   x Firm Imports .65
(.63)
   x R&D Intensity -1.38
(-1.28)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Number of Observations 30688 31248
Pseudo R
2 .14 .15
 Notes: Standardised coefficients in all regressions. Z-scores clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses. Industry dummies are defined at the three-digit level. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
 
 